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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing preoccupation with economic flexibility in the
industrialised economies, amongst both economists and policymakers. To a large
extent the perceived need for ‘greater flexibility’ derives from a number of
challenges which many of the OECD economies have had to face in the last quarter
of a century or so, and which seem likely to be on the policy agenda for some time
to come.
First, there is the perception that a number of OECD countries, and in
particular the Western European economies, have suffered for some time now from
some type of ‘structural malaise.’ This is an ill-defined concept, but it is usually
meant to refer to the twin problems of high and persistent unemployment and slow
growth.
Second, there is the challenge of those developing countries, or newly
industrialising economies (NIEs) which have been able to acquire a substantial
manufacturing base. There is a feeling that the continuing rise of economies such
as the Asian NIEs, and more recently China, will undermine living standards in the
OECD economies. Indeed, some commentators have seen the rise of the NIEs as
one of the causes of the European ‘structural malaise’.
Concurrently, the current technological revolution, or third-wave industrial
revolution, is seen as providing an environment in which those economies that
stand still and are unwilling to engage in structural change  will suffer even more. In
other words, there seems to be a feeling that global economic change is likely, if
anything, to accelerate in the next decade, thus exacerbating the problems faced by
many European economies so far.
But what exactly do we mean by economic flexibility and how is it to be
achieved? Making an economy more flexible presumably means removing rigidities
in labour and product markets, but this does not necessarily mean the adoption of a
free-market agenda. Indeed, economic flexibility could just as easily be found on an
interventionist policy agenda under the heading of ‘promoting structural change’.
The purpose of this paper is to look at some of these themes and to
examine some of the forces behind global economic change in the next few years,
and how this is likely to affect the European economies, and the UK in particular.
Any account of this type is likely to be highly speculative, and to avoid an excessive
amount of crystal-ball gazing, and to give the paper a basic structure, I would like to
organise my arguments around the following key questions.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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(1) What is the nature of the evidence suggesting that the OECD economies
(in particular the EU countries) are undergoing a period of ‘structural malaise’, and
what are the proposed solutions to these structural problems?
(2) What is the nature of the challenge provided by the newly industrialising
economies for the OECD countries?
(3) How is the further integration of the European economies likely to affect
the UK’s economic prospects?
The first of these is tackled in Section 2, and the other two are taken up in
Section 3 of the paper.
Of course, our primary interest in the context of this conference is the likely
impact of these changes on the housing market. Although this paper is merely
aimed at setting the scene for later conference contributions, I shall briefly discuss
some possible implications in the concluding section. As we shall see, there is still
considerable disagreement regarding the challenge of foreign competition, and any
conclusions regarding the likely impact of changing patterns of comparative
advantage on long-run UK economic conditions, and intra-UK economic
development, are bound to be tentative.
But some more definite conclusions can be reached as far as the
macroeconomic policy environment is concerned, and the likely impact on real
interest rates, and hence the UK capital and housing markets. Most economists are
increasingly recognising the need for a radical reappraisal of the way in which
macroeconomic policy should be conducted, and this has had an influence on
policymakers. As far as monetary policy is concerned, there has been a universal
shift away from discretionary policy towards mechanisms that ensure a credible anti-
inflation policy. In the short-run, the achievement of credibility has implied the
pursuit of high real short-term interest rates. It has also shifted attention to the
impact of  fiscal policy on real interest rates, and hence on the impact of fiscal
actions on long-run unemployment and growth. This is the issue which we turn to
first.
2.  Unemployment, Slow Growth and Structural Slumps
2.1 The Evidence on Slow Growth and Unemployment
There are few policy issues which have received as much attention as slow
European growth and high unemployment since the 1970s. After the unparalleledFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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levels of growth and high employment levels witnessed in the first two decades of
the post-war period, European economic performance has been less than
satisfactory in a number of areas. The length of the period of crisis has led most
commentators to speak of a ‘structural malaise’.
TABLE 1:
 GDP Growth, Productivity Growth and Unemployment in Some OECD
Economies
USA Europe Japan
GDP LP U GDP LP U GDP LP U
 1960-73 2.7 2.1 4.8 4.0 4.2 2.4 8.4 7.9 1.3
1973-80 0.8 -0.4 6.7 1.9 1.7 4.5 2.3 2.5 1.9
1981-90 2.0 1.8 7.0 2.0 1.5 8.2 3.7 3.4 2.5
Data Sources: Penn World Tables, OECD Economic Indicators. The Data for
Europe is an unweighted average of data for Germany, France, the UK and Italy.
But what is the extent of the problem faced by the various European
countries? Table 1 shows some data for real GDP growth, labour productivity
growth (measured as GDP per employee), and  unemployment for the post-war
period for an average of  the major European economies, the USA, and Japan.
Three points are worth making. First, the European economies have never re-
experienced the average rates of growth or low levels of unemployment that were
common in the period 1945-1973. It is worth remarking that the USA has
experienced a similar slowdown in economic growth, but Europe’s problems seem
to have been more serious in terms of poor unemployment performance. The USA
has not experienced upward-trending levels of unemployment over the same period.
Second, although productivity growth has slowed down in all the G7 economies
since the 1970s,  the European economies seemed to be performing worst on this
measure of productivity
1. The data on productivity merely confirms that Europe’s
performance has deteriorated since the 1970s. Third, the length of time over which
the unemployment crisis has lasted, and the fact that Europe has had a unique
combination of slower growth and higher unemployment, suggests that we are
                                                       
1 The only exception seems to be the UK, whose productivity growth was slower than that of
other European countries in the 1960s, and which performed relatively well in the 1980s.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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facing a ‘structural’ problem. What we are witnessing cannot be easily attributed to
business cycle episodes or one-off events such as the oil crises of the 1970s.
What are the explanations for this apparent structural malaise? In this
section I shall focus on a number of potential explanations for the two phenomena
of slow growth and high unemployment, focusing on each in turn, before discussing
potential linkages between them, and finally turning to macroeconomic policy
implications. We shall leave aside explanations based on changing patterns of trade
and comparative advantage in the world economy, which will be analysed in Section
3.
2.2 Explanations for Europe’s unemployment performance.
Under this heading we find a number of explanations. Perhaps the most
popular in recent years has been the argument that Europe’s labour markets have
exhibited an excessive short-run real wage rigidity due to inflexibility in our labour
markets compared to the labour markets in countries such as the USA and Japan. I
don’t want to say too much about these types of  approaches to explaining
unemployment, partly because a number of these issues will  be picked up in
tomorrow’s session on Labour Market Change. However, a brief summary of the
real wage rigidity story is necessary, in order to understand the causes of Europe’s
problems. The new approach to understanding macroeconomic adjustment in
labour markets has been pioneered in the UK by a number of researchers,
particularly at the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance, and the recent
collections and overviews of this work have received much publicity and acclaim
(Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, 1994).
The main theme of this approach is  that events in the late 1960s and early
1970s have led to the emergence of ‘real wage gaps’ in Europe (a gap between the
actual real wage and the long-run full employment real wage) and hence to
involuntary unemployment. The almost synchronous real wage pressure from
greater trade union militancy in the 1960s and the reduction in labour demand (and
the real wage available for labour) due to the oil shocks meant that labour priced
itself out of the market in the 1970s, generating higher levels of unemployment
(higher levels of the NAIRU, the rate of unemployment that is consistent with no
acceleration in inflation).
The story does not end there, however, as those pressures that led to an
original increase in the NAIRU in the 1970s have since subsided. The explanation
for Europe’s continuing high unemployment relies on so-called hysteresisFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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mechanisms. These imply that temporary recessions tend to cause an increase in
the NAIRU as the creation of unemployed workers (and particularly the long-term
unemployed) and the exit of firms during a recession reduces competitive pressures
in the labour market: surviving workers and firms are more willing and able to reach
‘excessive’ wage bargains and/or build up profit margins. Consequently, the real
wage tends to settle at a level at which the unemployment rate is higher than when
the recession began.
The hysteresis models provide convincing explanations of the lack of
flexibility in European labour markets which results in less flexible real wages over
the business cycle than in, say, North America. They have also been verified
empirically on numerous occasions, for a number of countries. However, some
economists are beginning to doubt that they represent the whole story, and
attempts have been made to develop theories which complement the imperfect
competition approach to labour markets. The reason why this might not be the
whole story is that hysteresis effects are unlikely to be permanent: there is no
evidence that a growing labour force leads to increasing unemployment. Manning
(1995) remarks that, as 25 years have now elapsed since Europe last experienced
low levels of unemployment, we should probably look towards more structural
explanations of the increase in the NAIRU, rather than relying on theories of short-
and medium-run labour market disequilibrium.
There are a variety of structural explanations for the high unemployment in
Europe. Some rely on changes in the macroeconomic policy environment, whilst
others look more narrowly once again to the performance of the labour market
alone.
Recently, Fitoussi and Phelps (1986), Newell and Symons (1987), and Lal
and Van Wijnbergen (1985) have focused on the link between higher real interest
rates and high unemployment, and this has formed the basis for a more complete
‘structuralist’ account of recent macroeconomic events in Phelps (1995). The overall
theory allows for complex interactions between macroeconomic policy, exogenous
productivity and technology shocks and employment. But for our current purposes, it
is useful to focus on a sub-set of these linkages. In particular, Phelps emphasises
the link between progressively expansionary fiscal policies in the world economy
and higher real interest rates, and from higher interest rates to higher
unemployment. The fact that expansionary fiscal policies cause high real interest
rates will not seem controversial to any economist who does not espouse anFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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extreme Ricardian view of government debt
2.  Indeed, one attraction of the fiscal
policy-real interest rate linkage is that it has an international dimension: one of the
main sources of fiscal imbalance in the 1980s was the Reagan administration’s
expansionary policy, which helped to raise world interest rates.
Rising real interest rates will then impact negatively on labour demand
through a variety of channels. One can think of a reduced rate of physical
investment
3, as real prices of capital assets fall, but one can also think of a
reduction in less visible, more subtle types of investment, such as work-force
training. Thus, the equilibrium rate of unemployment (the NAIRU) can be expected
to rise in those economies (such as in Europe) where there is considerable real
wage rigidity. Where real wages are less rigid, the fall in labour demand will be
partly accommodated by a fall in real wages. Phelps (1995) provides some formal
econometric evidence of the strength of this link.
For the purposes of some simple illustrations, in Table 2 I report the average
real interest rate
4 in some key countries and a net measure of government
indebtedness for various periods of time. This shows that most of the major
economies have accumulated debt over the last 25 years (the UK is an obvious
exception), and that this has coincided with the worldwide rise in real interest rates.
In addition Figure 1 shows a simple cross-sectional plot of average real interest
rates and levels of unemployment for the G6 economies in the 1960s (1960-1970)
and the 1980s (1981-1992). There is clear evidence that the rise in unemployment,
and slow-down in growth is positively correlated with higer real interest rates in the
1980s. The major implication of this theory is that high real interest rates took over
the role of depressing employment levels once the adverse effect of the oil shocks
began to dissipate.
FIGURE 1 here
                                                       
2 The Ricardian view reformulated, inter alia, in Barro (1974) argues that permanent
increases in government spending funded by debt issue will not have an impact on interest
rates because the private sector discounts the future taxation increases required to finance
and pay back the debt, and correspondingly adjust its savings behaviour.
3 For an analysis of the role of capital shortage in the European economies see also Dreze
(1987).
4 The real interest rate is simply measured as the nominal long-term rate minus inflation. This
makes the heroic assumption that actual inflation equalled expected inflation, but averaged
over several years this is likely to be an unbiased measure.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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TABLE 2:




















USA 27.8 1.9 18.6 1.0 34.9 5.6
Japan -65.4 0.8 17.3 -0.1 5.5 4.9
UK 76.0 2.9 47.0 -1.7 35.0 4.9
Germany -8.2 3.2 14.4 2.8 24.5 4.7
France 9.7 1.5 14.3 -0.2 25.6 5.2
Italy 36.8 1.3 54.0 -3.2 101.0 3.9
Data Sources: Datastream, OECD Economic Outlook. The Data for Net Debt is
taken at the end-point of the sub-period. The data on the real interest rate is an
average for the period.
There are potential objections to the Phelps thesis. One obvious
counterargument is that high real interest rates coincided in the 1980s with a period
of booming stock markets. This contradicts aspects of the theory, and rising stock
markets should have had an offsetting effect on the cost of capital (see Barro, 1990,
1991). But most firms do not rely on stock market issues, and hence on balance
there are still good reasons for believing the cost-of-capital argument.
One can amplify the linkage between macroeconomic policy, capital markets
and investment by appealing to other important effects. Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1993, 1995) suggest that any reductions in firms’ net worth will increase their risk
aversion and hence will make them less likely  to risk hiring labour where there are
significant hiring and firing costs. Labour adjustment costs are notoriously high in
Europe, and hence this fits the pattern quite well. Greater uncertainty in the
economic environment will bring forth a similar response on the part of firms. Stiglitz
and Weiss (1985) and others have also stressed that credit rationing, along with
cost-of-capital considerations, is likely to be important in capital markets.
One interesting aspect of the interest rate link is that the emphasis in
monetary policy in the OECD economies has decidedly shifted towards the targeting
of inflation as the sole or main objective of policy. They have sought to achieve
greater credibility in anti-inflation policy through various reputation-enhancing
devices, such as greater central bank independence, or in the UK’s case, greater
transparency in the process whereby the Treasury and the Bank of England reach
decisions regarding Base Rate movements (see King, 1995). Whether a tough,Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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credible, anti-inflation stance necessarily implies a less flexible approach to
stabilising business cycles is still an open theoretical and empirical question (see
Rogoff, 1985, Alesina and Summers, 1992, De Long and Summers, 1992,
Muscatelli, 1995, Leiderman and Svensson, 1995). What is undeniable, however, is
that traditionally high-inflation economies in the 1970s and early 1980s  such as
France, Italy and the UK have had to pay the price of higher real interest rates whilst
they tried to acquire a reputation for being tough on inflation. Figure 2 shows how
high nominal interest rates in most OECD economies are positively correlated to
their past inflation performance. Consequently, this does not augur well for an
improved employment performance in the future. For the purposes of our argument
it does not matter whether the current high real interest rates have been caused by
a slow adjustment in inflationary expectations as monetary policy has become
tighter, or due to a lack of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal authorities
5.
FIGURE 2 here
Besides emphasising the role of real interest rates since the 1980s,
structural theories look at the impact of Europe’s social policies on the workings of
the macroeconomy. Some economists see the whole edifice of social welfare
arrangements in Europe as a root cause of structural problems. An early exponent
of this notion of  ‘Eurosclerosis’ was Giersch (1985). Some of these effects have
now been incorporated in modern theories of the labour markets. Economists now
pay much more attention to the incentive effects of welfare benefits, and indeed the
duration of unconditional benefits is seen as an important source of real wage
rigidity (see Layard et al. 1991, Phelps, 1995).
But this cannot by itself explain the dynamic of Europe’s unemployment
problems. After all, most of Europe’s welfare state measures were in place well
before the crisis began in the 1970s, and some of the more extravagant parts of
these welfare states have already been trimmed back . To explain the timing and
persistence of Europe’s crisis, Assar Lindbeck (1985, 1994, 1995) has appealed to
notions of ‘welfare-state dynamics’, whose effects only become entrenched over
long periods of time. Lindbeck’s argument is that it took considerable time for the
welfare state to have an impact on attitudes to work, due to slowly changing social
norms and habits.  Similarly the emergence of problems of moral hazard and
                                                       
5 This is a by-product of greater central bank independence which is often ignored in the
literature on credibility. Yet, as the Volcker-Reagan era in the US has shown, it is a matter of
some importance. For a recent account of these problems in the context of international
policy co-ordination, see Muscatelli (1996).Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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cheating in the welfare state is seen as the gradual evolution of a system in which
the less privileged in society see the exploitation of ‘the system’ as an acceptable
mode of behaviour. At the same time, the existence of such disincentive effects and
moral hazard will lead to resentment amongst taxpayers who will object to
increasing taxation
6 to fund the welfare state. Lindbeck’s warnings about declining
‘Protestant ethics’ and ‘Prussian discipline’ may seem rather frivolous to some
observers. But the idea that social norms and economic behaviour may be altered
by the emergence of a ‘critical mass’ of people with new behaviour patterns, and
that this vicious circle could have been triggered by the problems of the early 1970s,
is worth considering as an explanation for the persistence of Europe’s problems.
TABLE 3
Growth in Public Spending by Category of Expenditure in Europe
Current Transfers
(Change as % of GDP
in 1981-1993)
Govt. Consumption
(Change as % of GDP
in 1981-1993)
Capital Spending
(Change as % of GDP
in 1981-1993)
Germany 2.0 -0.3 -0.4
UK 0.8 -0.2 0.5
France 3.2 0.3 0.3
Italy 3.6 1.3 -0.9
Source: European Economy, 1994. Amounts shown are changes in the proportion
of GDP dedicated to different categories of expenditure.
What is undoubtedly true is that the growth of government expenditures in
the European countries in recent years has been weighted towards transfers (social
security and welfare measures) and general government consumption, and away
from capital spending. Table 3 shows that capital spending has fared less well than
transfers of consumption spending, with the possible exception of the UK. In terms
of a structuralist perspective this is the worst of all possible worlds as the increase in
government spending and indebtedness will force up the cost of capital. In contrast,
increased government investment could have offset the decline in private
investment, but this has so far failed to happen.
One final, and popular, explanation for high unemployment in Europe has
been based on the notion that greater ‘automation’, the substitution of capital for
labour, has displaced labour in Europe (see Rostow, 1983, Drucker, 1986). At first
                                                       
6 Which in some countries with inefficient public administrations have also led to massive
problems of tax evasion (e.g. Italy, Greece).Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
10
sight, this explanation looks reasonably attractive. Inflexibilities in the labour market
might have led employers to engage in capital-deepening, and real wage rigidities in
the face of this could explain higher unemployment. A telling problem with this
theory is that, as we noticed in Table 1, European labour productivity has also been
growing slower since the 1970s, which does not fit well with a story of capital-labour
substitution. Also, arguments based on capital-deepening would need to be
reconciled with the view that a capital shortage, and slow investment (see Table 4),
was also an important element in Europe’s crisis, and indeed this position underpins
the Phelps thesis. Reconciling these various observations empirically is not a
straightforward matter, as it involves taking into account simultaneously the effects
of changing technology, factor substitution, as well as price and wage-
determination. Artus (1974) and Dreze and Bean (1990) provide some interesting
insights into these issues, including the extent to which slower investment co-
existed with capital-deepening. In particular, Dreze and Bean calculate the impact of
the incorporation of productivity gains into real wages. This in turn induced capital-
labour substitution, thus making it impossible for employment to grow. The reduction
in employment growth in Europe was calculated at about 2-2.5% until the late 1970s
and 0.5-1% between the late 1970s and 1986 - a significant amount in the context
of Europe’s overall unemployment problem.
TABLE 4:








Source: Maddison (1991), Own computations on World Bank Data.
However, it is important to stress that a key factor in the above mechanism is
still labour market inflexibility. After all, it would be hard to blame exogenous
improvements in technology and total factor productivity for unemployment
7.
                                                       
7 However, a literature is emerging which is seeking to explore the linkages between
unemployment and growth. Aghion and Howitt (1994) suggest that productivity growth may
have an impact on the level of unemployment through its effects on search behaviour.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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Historically, from the industrial revolution onwards, there is no evidence that
technological change creates unemployment; it might generate temporary structural
unemployment problems (and problems of shifts in income distribution between
different types of workers) but these problems should subside over time, if relative
prices and wages are allowed to adjust.
This is not to say that capital-deepening is not an important issue, and that
technological change will not affect unemployment patterns in the future; it would be
dangerous to dismiss the potential role of technological change in the midst of a
technological revolution! And even if unemployment is not a concern because of
sufficient overall increase in real wage flexibility, as I have already remarked the
distributional issues are likely to be important. Davis (1992) reports a rising wage
differential between more and less educated workers in the 1980s in most countries
except Japan (see Table 5), and similar differentials might be emerging between
skilled and unskilled workers. Certainly the evidence points to greater overall
income inequality, not only in the case of the United States, but also in other OECD
countries (see Figure 3, which reports data from Katz et al. 1993), which might
reflect an increased skills mismatch, even though the existing evidence on
mismatch (occupational and regional) is fairly mixed (see Blanchard, 1990). It
seems indisputable that, even when we eventually manage to tackle Europe’s
unemployment problem, the current pace of technological change might require a
sufficiently flexible labour force to adapt to sudden changes in relative sectoral
demands. In the short run this might produce even higher wage premia for
education.
                                                                                                                                                              
Innovations can destroy jobs and will require labour reallocation between sectors. Thus faster
growth increases the job separation rate and costly search discourages firms from opening
new vacancies. Hence unemployment and growth might be positively related. However, this
‘creative destruction’ effect could potentially be more than offset by the fact that higher
growth raises the present discounted value of the profits from new jobs (a capitalization
effect), which might encourage firms to post vacancies. For an alternative model linking
productivity growth and unemploymen, see Manning (1992).Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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TABLE 5
Earnings and Education Differentials: Wage Premia to Education





Data Sources: Davis (1992), OECD (1995). The observation points are as follows:
USA (1979, 1987), UK (1980, 1988), Japan (1979, 1987), Germany (1981, 1984).
The ratio shown is the ratio of earnings between the following education groups: US
(college-high school leavers), UK (University-no qualification), Japan (College-upper
high school leavers), Germany (14-18/11-13 years of education).
FIGURE 3 here
2.3 Slow Growth in Europe and Links between Unemployment and Growth.
To some extent slow growth in Europe could be attributed simply to a
slowdown in capital accumulation. From the 1970s onwards, investment growth in
Europe has slowed down relative to those witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s (see
Table 4). Some explanations for this are straightforward and follow from our
discussion in the previous section:  a high cost of capital, combined with advanced
scrapping of capacity during the deep recessions of 1970s and early 1980s, and
with the fall in profitability in the 1970s as real wage rigidity and rising primary
commodity costs squeezed profits, can explain the slow-down in investment.
Increased uncertainty about future economic conditions possibly also played a part,
especially where firms have to rely on loans as a source of finance.  Thus the
events that triggered the increase in unemployment had concurrent effects on
European investment and growth.
But the potential interactions between unemployment and productivity
growth might also have had a role to play. Evidence on this is far harder to come by,
but some potential channels of interdependence have been identified by
economists in recent years. Essentially the debate here is between those
economists who hold a neo-Schumpeterian position by arguing that recessions
actually stimulate economic growth because they push less efficient firms out the
market, and because the opportunity cost of reorganisation is lower at a time when
firms are not operating at full production capacity (see Caballero and Hammour,
1991, Hall, 1991, Aghion and St. Paul, 1991). Against this view, some economistsFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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argue that recessions are periods of lost opportunity in terms of productivity
enhancement because of the importance of ‘learning-by-doing’ effects in innovation
(that is, cumulative experience is likely to be an important force in driving
productivity growth). (See Bahk and Gort, 1993, Stadler, 1990, Muscatelli and Tirelli,
1995). The macroeconomic evidence to date probably favours the second
hypothesis, partly because of the dominant effect of the post-1970s data. However
much  empirical work still needs to be done at a microeconomic level to verify
whether these forces are at work at the micro-level, and whether either of them is
dominant.
The potential policy implications of this debate are not trivial: in the previous
section we suggested that a regime of less flexible monetary and fiscal policies
might be on the cards for the foreseeable future. If that is the case, recessions will
be less easy to offset, and it would be interesting to be able to gauge the effects of
this on long-run productivity growth.
2.4 Some Policy Implications
There are a number of wide-ranging explanations for Europe’s economic
difficulties, and especially the persistence of the high unemployment problem. We
have seen that most of them hinge on some version of the real wage rigidity and
medium-run story as at least a part of the explanation. But at the same time there is
the suspicion that other forces, more structural and deep-rooted, may also be
playing an increasing role. These range from increasing skills mismatch, to a high
cost of capital, to an intrusive welfare state which is increasingly changing social
norms and attitudes. Some of these structural explanations would require a
considerable degree of fiscal retrenchment, or at the very least a switch from
consumption to capital spending on the part of governments, especially in education
and infrastructure which might help to bolster future productivity growth (see
Aschauer, 1989, Munnell, 1990). Others would not necessarily look to a reduction in
fiscal interventionism, but merely an adjustment of taxation and welfare measures to
reduce real wage rigidity and improve incentives in the labour market.
 However, these various supply-side policies might be severely limited by the
macro-policy environment. With monetary policy measures almost entirely dedicated
to the control of inflation, and many European countries still looking towards
European Monetary Union, governments will find little room for manoeuvre on the
fiscal side as well. This does not augur well for growth if we believe that one of theFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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key causes of slow investment, slow growth and high unemployment has been an
increasingly uncertain economic environment, and if we believe that some degree of
government intervention is necessary to ensure a less painful process of structural
change as the technological revolution continues.
3. STRUCTURAL CHANGE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY
In this section we turn our attention to the likely impact of changes in
patterns of trade in the world economy. As explained in the introduction, there are
two issues relating to economic flexibility which have attracted the attention of
commentators and policymakers (see European Commission, 1993, OECD, 1994).
The first is the impact of the emergence of the newly industrialised economies
(NIEs) on the OECD countries. For the European economies this provides a further
element to  the structural malaise story: as developing countries become major
manufacturing producers, the argument is that the OECD economies will experience
a deterioration in its terms of trade vis-à-vis the NIEs, and a reduction in welfare.
There is no doubt that over the last 25 years, the OECD economies have become
more open to trade, with trade ratios rising considerably. Furthermore, since 1970
the percentage of total imports from developing economies has risen from 14 per
cent to about 35 per cent in the US, and from 5 per cent to 12 per cent in the
European Union.
The second major event of note is the process of European integration that
is and will continue to take place in Europe, and which might begin to alter its
economic geography over time. We now look at each of these issues in turn.
3.1 the impact of the NIEs on the Industrialised Economies
The ‘problem’ of increased import penetration from the NIEs into the came to
the fore in the 1980s, as the shares of world trade from the Asian NIEs in particular
began to rise sharply. More recently, this economic success has not been confined
to the original Asian NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong), but
has spread to the rest of East Asia, with larger economies like China joining the
race to industrialisation. So is economic development in Asia a ‘threat’ to Europe?
If one takes a conventional, neoclassical approach to analysing international
trade, then economic development in one region cannot be detrimental to anotherFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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region. The reason is simple: higher productivity in the world economy as a whole
actually benefits consumers everywhere by reducing the prices of goods and
services, thus opening up the way for efficiency gains. Thus, if the OECD
economies (the North) tend to  specialise in the production of high-technology
goods, whilst the NIEs tend to specialise in the manufacture of goods lower down
the technology ladder, an increase in labour productivity in the NIEs will further
lower the world price of low-technology goods. This improves consumer welfare in
the OECD, and merely means that the North has to shift its production even further
away from low-technology towards high-technology products. This restructuring
process may not be painless, especially in the presence of wage inflexibility, and we
shall return to this issue below.
However, newer approaches to international trade can produce a richer
range of results, depending upon the assumptions made about the nature of
economies of scale in production and the nature of the process of innovation. For
instance, Krugman (1986) develops a ‘technology gap’ model of international trade
in which a narrowing of the technology gap by the developing countries (an
improvement in labour productivity) pushes them further up the technology ladder
and can make the developed economies worse off. This happens because the
productivity gains in the NIEs raise their wages and the developed economies now
have to pay more for the lower-tech goods which they import from the NIEs.
Alternatively, one can appeal to models with economies of scale and with dynamic
comparative advantage in manufacturing whereby once NIEs begin to acquire
Northern technologies and penetrate in world markets, a self-reinforcing mechanism
is created tending to shift manufacturing from the developed economies to the NIEs.
Unless the developed economies are able to innovate at a reasonable pace,
consumers in the developed economies might become worse off. Again the reason
for this stems from  higher wages in the developing economies and hence a shift in
the terms of trade against the North
8.
                                                       
8 In an alternative more sophisticated framework, Krugman and Venables (1995)
demonstrate how globalization (the progressive integration of world markets through lower
transportation and communications costs) can actually shift the distribution of incomes in
different directions at different points in time. The mechanism here is once again a self-
reinforcing advantage through external economies of scale both in the use of manufactures
as intermediate goods and in the production of manufactures for final consumption. These
forces tend to create a natural tendency toward agglomeration of manufacturing, thus
explaining the creation of a core-periphery set-up in world manufacturing (the industrialised
economies and the Third World), resulting in much higher wages in the industrialised
economies. But the progressive integration of world markets (lower
transportation/comunication costs or lower trade barriers) implies that at some stage lowerFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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However, these alternative models have to be interpreted with care, and
even some of their proponents are sceptical that the development of the Asian NIEs
are really at the heart of slower growth in the Northern economies. For instance
Krugman (1994) argues that there is little evidence that the developed economies
are suffering such an adverse impact on their terms of trade from the emergence of
the NIEs. The terms of trade of the OECD economies relative to the rest of the
world actually improved in the 1980s by 12-15% due to falling primary commodity
prices.  Also, in terms of success breeding success, one has to remark that total
factor productivity growth in some Asian NIEs has actually been unremarkable by
Northern standards (see Young, 1992), suggesting that investment has more to do
with these countries success than a closing of the ‘technology gap
9.’ Indeed, the
real issue is again one of the distribution of benefits and losses within the OECD
economies. Whilst the industrialised economies will gain in the longer run from an
increase in productivity in the world economy, in the short run it will require them to
transform their industrial structure, moving out of those sectors which are being
taken over by the NIEs and developing new sectors in their place. Given the
problems with labour market rigidities experienced in Europe in the last 20 years, a
rapid pace of change could present us with considerable macroeconomic
adjustment problems, and it is likely to exacerbate any skills mismatch which is
present.
Can the size of this potential macroeconomic adjustment problem be
quantified? One of the difficulties with the theoretical models of international trade
discussed above is that they are not readily amenable to empirical testing. Instead,
macroeconometric models, which are not particularly useful to analyse major
structural change, can at least be used to offer insights into the likely impact effects
of increased import penetration by the NIEs.
To give an idea of the possible impact of an acceleration in NIE penetration I
report some projections that were obtained using the National Institute’s GEM model
of the world economy
10. The shock to which the European economies were
                                                                                                                                                              
Third World wages might be sufficient to offset the cost advantage of the core thus causing a
redistribution of world manufacturing towards the periphery.
9 Although it has to be said that measurements of TFP growth are fraught with difficulties in
these countries due to problems in constructing useful measures of the capital stock at a time
of rapid economic change (see Young, 1992, Griliches, 1994).
10 These simulations are reported from some unpublished joint research with Jonathan
Ireland (University of Strathclyde), Patrizio Tirelli (Catholic University, Milan), T.G.
Srinivasan (The World Bank) and  David Vines (Balliol College, Oxford), as part an EC-
funded research project on EC-NIE trade (grant no. SPES-UK-0007). I am of course solely
responsible for any errors, omissions, and misinterpretations.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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subjected was equivalent to what would occur if the original four Asian NIEs had
managed to double their export growth to Europe. This might seem excessive, but
one has to remember that the four NIEs involved have relatively small shares of
world trade, and that the degree of increased penetration by these countries of US
and Japanese markets was roughly equivalent to this in the decade 1976-1986. We
looked at the effects of the import shocks under various policy response scenarios,
but Table 6 shows the impact on some key indicators after 2 and 4 years under the
assumption that the G7 economies stabilise their real interest rates and do not have
the foresight to react to the shock. The figures are given as percentage differences
from base,( i.e. from the projected path of these economies in the absence of the
shock).
TABLE 6

















USA 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.71
Japan 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.21
Germany -0.14 -0.25 -0.03 -0.07 0.84 2.21
UK -0.48 -1.50 -0.09 -0.46 1.95 5.58
France -0.20 -0.52 -0.07 -0.13 1.06 3.09
Italy -0.33 -1.08 -0.07 -0.21 1.33 4.49
Notes: The GDP and import volume figures are shown as percentage differences
from base level; the Inflation figures as difference from base annual growth rate.
The nature of the shock is asymmetric, because certain European
economies have been more traditionally more open to NIE imports (e.g. the UK),
and the nature of the shocks considered amplifies this effect. The other main
reason for the asymmetry between different European countries is of course the
differences in the speed of adjustment of their supply side. But the main point to
note is the fact that for some of the European economies, the deflationary shock is
reasonably large and persistent. In the case of the UK, GDP is 1.5 % below the
baseline after 4 years and inflation is 0.5% lower. Even if one is sceptical about the
ability of the four original NIEs to deliver such a major import  surge, the dimension
of some of the newer NIEs (e.g. China) suggests that the macroeconomic
adjustment problem considered here is not too unrealistic.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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An alternative perspective on the impact effects of greater developing import
penetration has come from Wood (1994, 1995), which examines the factor content
of imports. The argument deployed by Wood is relatively straightforward, and
focuses on the labour skill content of different sectors. One of the key problems in
examining the impact of greater imports on factor demand in the importing country
is to quantify the factor content of these goods: but should one use the labour input
coefficients in the importing (developed) country, or that of the exporting
(developing) country to compute this impact when there are differences in the
nature of imported goods and import-competing goods? Traditionally studies have
taken the former, but Wood argues that this underestimates the impact on labour
demand because in the absence of such import penetration, the developed
economy might have produced different goods, using more labour-intensive
methods. Wood (1994) also argues that trade induces labour-saving technological
progress in import-competing sectors, which further reduces the demand for
unskilled labour.
All this evidence rests on the adjustments made on factor content by Wood
(1994) in his study, which provides an interesting alternative approach. However, it
has been subjected to considerable criticism by those who feel that the magnitude
of these trade effects have been exaggerated (see Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993,
Krugman and Lawrence, 1994)
11 because the relative prices of labour intensive
goods have not declined in the case of the US. Furthermore, the impact of total
factor productivity growth on sectors with different labour skill intensity does not
show the differential labour-saving innovation effect claimed by Wood (see Sachs
and Shatz, 1994).
3.2 European Integration and the Geography of Manufacturing Activity
Our last question for discussion relates to the impact of further European
integration on the UK. The study of the distribution of economic production in space
is of course a well-established discipline, but recently it has attracted many trade
theorists who have sought to analyse the impact of greater integration on individual
regions. Using exactly the sort of models which are normally employed to analyse
international trade, they look at the impact on the distribution of economic activity as
barriers to factor mobility are removed and nations become regions of a bigger
economic entity.
                                                       
11 For a more detached comment, see Freeman (1995) and Richardson (1995).Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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Krugman (1991a, 1991b) studies some of the effects of a removal of barriers
to mobility in the presence of economies of scale in the production of
manufactures
12. Not suprisingly, the models tend to show that a variety of equilibria
are possible but that generally, in the presence of transportation costs,
agglomerations are likely to occur because of the presence of external economies
of scale and/or technology spillovers, so that firms choose to be closer to each other
and to larger markets. Krugman notes how this tendency for agglomeration in
manufacturing, and regional specialisation has been much more extreme in the US
than in Europe due to the existence until very recently of barriers to trade, and the
permanence of many barriers to factor mobility. Table 7, taken from Krugman
(1991b), shows the shares of manufacturing employment in four different
manufacturing sectors in two European countries and two US regions.
TABLE 7
Industrial Specialisation in the US and Europe
(Share of Manufacturing Employment)
Germany Italy US Midwest US South
Textiles 3.7 9.1 0.3 11.7
Apparel 2.6 5.6 2.4 10.6
Machinery 15.8 12.9 15.0 7.1
Transport Eq. 13.2 10.4 12.8 5.9
Notes: Source Krugman (1991b), Table 3.2, p.78. Data shows share of
manufacturing employment.
What are the implications of this for greater European integration? If one
were to take the simplest of these models at face value one might conclude that, if
the gradual process of European integration will lead to a gradual increase in factor
mobility, then it will have the following effects:
(a) First, there might be a tendency for geographically more remote parts of Europe
like the UK to find it difficult to hold on to some of its industries
13, as external
economies of scale and technological spillover effects begin to exert a centripetal
force towards the industrial heartlands of Europe.
(b) With the UK having already experienced a reduction in its manufacturing base
relative to some other European countries, e.g. Germany, it would be difficult for us
                                                       
12 Some of these themes were of course central to Marshall’s (1920) analysis of localization.
13 As Krugman (1991b) notes, it might be argued that the welfare implications of these major
regional shifts are not easy to work out in any case, as factor mobility would imply major
shifts in population as well as in capital.Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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to hold on to retain a presence in a number of sectors which are already well-
established elsewhere in Europe.
  Does this still happen without complete factor mobility? After all, one could
argue that factor mobility, and in particular labour mobility, is unlikely to increase
much in Europe for the foreseeable future. Already mobility within the EU countries
is limited (see McMaster and Pissarides, 1990, for a study on UK regional migration)
and language and cultural barriers will be formidable for some time to come (see
Ermisch, 1995). Unfortunately, without labour mobility, as shown by Krugman and
Venables (1995),  one might yet get a considerable degree of specialisation, but this
will now translate into the emergence of larger real wage differentials in favour of
those economies which are attracting manufacturing industries
14.
But there could be important offsetting effects. For one thing, provided
transportation costs are relatively low, if relative wages are sufficiently low, or if
labour markets are sufficiently flexible, this might more than offset the disadvantage
of being on the periphery and away from the main European markets and suppliers.
The relatively large  foreign direct investment flows into the UK seems to confirm
this. Second, although the discussion so far has tended to focus on manufactures,
technological change might actually have a greater impact on the provision of
services in the next decade. Indeed, it is arguable that  whilst ‘transportation costs’
(the driving force behind agglomeration) are likely to fall little, if at all, in
manufacturing, the ability to transmit information is likely to grow much faster and
thus the greatest drive towards concentration is likely to be in services
15, where the
UK might be in a better position to establish a dominant position.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have looked at some of the challenges that are likely to face the OECD,
and in particular the European economies over the next few years. Having failed to
adjust fully to the macroeconomic shocks which hit them in the late 1960s and
1970s, Europe now has to face the challenge and uncertainty of rapid technological
change. Most economists seem to be agreed that one of the major causes of the
                                                       
14 One further interesting possibility would emerge if different types of labour (e.g. labour with
a high degree of human capital) found it easier to move in such an integrated economy than
low-human capital labour. In this case, the wage differentials would emerge mainly amongst
low-human capital workers between different countries, creating wide ranges of income
distribution patterns across Europe.
15 Indeed, the concentration in services in the Southeast of the UK is probably an example of
this (see Krugman. 1991).Flexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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problems of the last two decades, labour market inflexibility, needs to be tackled in
order to face future supply-side shocks, which might include major changes in the
pattern of trade.
There are different schools of thought on the role that the state should play
in the process of structural change. Whilst some economists see Europe’s welfare
state as a potential asset in a period of rapid structural change in reducing social
tensions, others have pointed to this social buffer as one of the very sources of
inflexibility, delaying adjustment and perpetuating the problem of unemployment
and slow growth. One area where there does seem to some degree of consensus is
in the necessity to look more to public investment rather than government
consumption as a way to improve the supply side of the economy. Thus investment
in education and infrastructure may be more productive in improving the flexibility of
labour markets and the attractiveness of the UK as an industrial location in the face
of increasing foreign competition.
However, one major constraint here is the current macroeconomic policy
environment. After two decades of struggling against volatile inflation, most OECD
countries are understandably reluctant to take any action that might threaten a
resurgence of inflation. With monetary policy dedicated to the achievement of low
and stable inflation, and fiscal policy in Europe and the UK undergoing if anything a
certain degree of consolidation (see European Commission, 1994), it seems unlikely
that any adverse macroeconomic shocks could be easily offset, or that major fiscal
policy initiatives could be taken by any future government to achieve a rapid
transformation of the supply side of the European economies. The process of
change might at times be frustratingly slow.
The implications for markets such as the UK housing market should be
apparent. After the remarkable effect of the cyclical boom in the 1980s, many
commentators are now wondering whether a recovery can really be labelled such
until the ephemeral ‘feelgood factor’ becomes more apparent. But it seems
inevitable that, if the UK government is very serious about keeping the lid on
inflation, these types of cyclical phenomenon cannot recur in the future. Housing
might also begin to lose its value as a hedge against inflation. On the positive side,
any supply-side success, either through fiscal retrenchment, or through changes in
the overall structure of fiscal policy will be beneficial, both through the reduction in
unemployment levels and through the likely spillover effects from capital markets to
other asset markets such as housing. Finally, a period of major structural change, inFlexibility, Structural Change and the Global Economy
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which wage differentials open up between skilled and unskilled workers or between
different social groups will undoubtedly also be a period in which we might expect
the performance of the housing market to become much more fragmented, both
between regions and between different types of housing.
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